

DISTRICT SAFETY AND HEALTH COMMITTEE  
ACTIVE SHOOTER/LOCKDOWN SUB-COMMITTEE REPORT  
8-21-14

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**ACTIVE SHOOTER/LOCKDOWN SUB-COMMITTEE**

The mass shooting on December 12, 2012 at Sandy Hook Elementary School in Newtown, Connecticut started some discussions among the faculty and staff about the preparations that the District is making for a potential active shooter scenario. The primary concerns were as follows:

1. What is the District's policy on lock down?
2. Can instructors lock their class room doors during class?
3. Most faculty don't have keys to the lecture halls to be able to lock the doors. Can they have keys? If not, why not?
4. How do you barricade an outwardly opening door that can't be locked?
5. How are we notified when there is an emergency (i.e., shooter)?
6. What are the plans for training faculty, staff and students about lockdown, active shooter, etc.?

In January 2013, a formal request was made for the District Safety and Health Committee (DSHC) to review this subject. At the DSHC's February 21<sup>st</sup>, 2013 meeting the DSHC formed the Active Shooter/Lockdown Sub-Committee (ASLDSC). The ASLDSC first met on March 7<sup>th</sup>, 2013, and met for a total of five sessions with their last meeting being on March 13<sup>th</sup>, 2014. The membership consisted of the following DSHC representatives:

- Doug Kuula: Manager, Environmental Health and Safety, DSHC Chair
- Matt McCaffrey: Chief of Police
- Paul Bielen: Director of Facilities Operations
- Gary Watts: Manager, Building & Equipment Maintenance
- Joe Corcoran: Faculty Representative
- Omar Paz: Student Representative
- Eli Black: Student Representative
- Scott Wimmer: Student Representative

Technical assistance was provided by Eric Rausch: Locksmith

**ASLDSC RESPONSE TO PRIMARY CONCERNS**

**What is the District's Policy on Lockdown?**

Generally speaking the term "lockdown" means a security measure taken during an emergency to prevent people from leaving or entering a building. In a school setting this usually means students are kept in the classroom with the doors locked and the shades drawn in response to some type of external

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threat. Typically “lockdowns” are employed on smaller, centralized campuses with a younger, less mobile population. The ASLDSC found that there is no specific District policy pertaining to lockdown, and that there is a wide variability among the District’s facilities when it comes to the ability to perform a lockdown in an emergency. Most door locks are not lockable from the inside, and most lecture halls are opened in the morning, either by District Police, or in newer buildings, by the C-CURE Security System. Because of this, most faculty and staff do not possess keys to the lecture halls, nor do they possess the ability to override the C-CURE System. It also appears that the C-CURE System has limited ability to perform a global lockdown in a timely fashion. The District currently has two methods to mass communicate an emergency message (e.g. lockdown and/or shelter-in-place), ALERTU and NetSupport Notify. These are discussed below.

**Can instructors lock their class room doors during class?**

Apparently, some instructors lock their classrooms to prevent late students from disturbing the class. This might also be viewed as a security measure, since the classroom is essentially locked down prior to an emergency. The ASLDSC recommends that instructors not lock their classroom doors during class, unless there is an emergency. Students need to be able to access their class, even if they are late. With that said, late students should proceed to their seats with a minimum of class disruption.

**Most faculty don’t have keys to the lecture halls to be able to lock the doors. Can they have keys? If not, why not?**

The ASLDSC determined that issuing lecture hall keys would have a huge impact on the Facilities Operations Department with respect to the following areas:

1. Increased cost for the additional key blanks.
2. Increased staffing needs (Locksmith) to make keys, store keys, and to re-key locks when keys are lost, as well as to address the increased wear on the locks themselves.
3. Increased staffing needs (Administrative Assistant) to issue and receive keys, and to resolve key related problems.

In addition, most locks must be key locked from the outside, which exposes the person locking the door to the external hazard.

Rather than issuing lecture hall keys, the ASLDSC recommends that the District replace the current locks, that can’t be locked from the inside, with ones that can be locked with a simple push of a button or turn of a knob.

**How do you barricade an outwardly opening door that can’t be locked?**

The ASLDSC found that there was some guidance directing people to use something (e.g. a belt) to secure the door handle to a piece of furniture (e.g. a desk) that would block the opening of the door. However, it is more effective to use the standard guidance that is provided by the Department of Homeland Security in their *Run, Hide, Fight* training video. This is the same guidance that the District Police have recommended in their presentations that include the *Shot Fired on Campus: When Lightning*

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*Strikes* video. This video recommends a person: Get Out, Hide Out, Take Out. Both trainings recommend that, when hiding, you locking the door (if possible), and then barricade the door to disrupt the entry of the active shooter.

The ASLDSC also reviewed an item called “The Cinch”, which is a tool that can be wrapped around the door handle, and then clamped to the door frame to essentially lock the door. The ASLDSC found that the device can easily be destroyed with a vigorous pull of the door, and that it slips off of many of the door frames around the District. In addition, the device can’t be used on doors with panic bars.

**How are we notified when there is an emergency i.e., shooter?**

The ASLDSC determined that the District offers two forms of District specific mass notification: AlertU and NetSupport Notify.

AlertU is a text messaging system that can be used to alert faculty, staff and students to an emergency situation. The procedures for enrolling are located on the District Police website at: <http://www.santarosa.edu/administration/college-safety/district-police/index.shtml>.

NetSupport Notify is a computer based messaging system that is placed on all District owned computers by the Information Technology Department. In the event of an emergency, a message can be sent out that will pop-up on the screens of District owned computers.

The District Police also advocate that faculty, staff and students sign up for Nixle, which is a text messaging system that can be tailored to provide emergency updates form a variety of law enforcement and emergency services agencies.

**What are the plans for training faculty, staff and students about lockdown, active shooter, etc.?**

The ASLDSC has worked with the Environmental Health and Safety Department and the District Police to provide trainings on how to survive an active shooter situations. Currently, there are three trainings offered at the beginning of each semester, two on the Santa Rosa Campus (day and evening) and one on the Petaluma Campus. The District Police will also schedule additional trainings at other times upon request.

**ASLDSC RECOMMENDATIONS**

The ASLDSC makes recommendations in the following four areas:

1. Active Shooter Training
2. Building Lock Upgrades
3. ALERTU Enrollment
4. Early Intervention

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**ASLDSC RECOMMENDATIONS (DETAILED)**

**Recommendation 1: Active Shooter Training**

Because of the nature of active shooter events, it is extremely difficult and costly to provide a facilities based solutions, and therefore the ASLDSC felt that the most effective method to help people is to train them in what to expect and do when confronted with an active shooter situation. The District should continue to provide, and if possible increase, regularly scheduled training opportunities related to how to prepare for and survive an active shooter situation.

**Recommendation 2: Building Lock Upgrades**

The ASLDSC reviewed several lock options provided by the District Locksmith, Eric Rausch, and found that the most simple to use were the ones that lock from the inside, by a simple push of a button or turn of a knob. The main other option involved a key lock on both sides with the ability to lock the door from the inside. This option seemed to be very confusing, and would require that key be issued for lecture hall doors, wasting resources. The additional time required to find the key, and then figure out how to lock the door, would also greatly increase the time it takes to lock the door.

As old buildings are scheduled for a key upgrades and/or remodeling, or for new buildings, the District should specify that the locks must be easy to lock from the inside, by a simple push of a button or turn of a knob. The cost of converting the entire District at one time is estimated at \$1,000,000, so this conversion must be phased in. The scheduling of an upgrade should be based on a rubric that prioritizes based on potential for mass casualties, but is also balanced with efficient use of District resources.

The ASLDSC has developed the following rubric for selecting buildings for conversion to these types of locks.

1. Obvious vulnerabilities-Young children (More incidents at K-12 institutions, we have preschool kids, Sandy Hook Elementary School is 2nd most fatal school shooting, <http://www.stoptheshootings.org/attacks>)
2. Obvious vulnerabilities-Large auditoriums, or close proximity of many lecture rooms. (Ability to attack many people at one time. Virginia Tech: [http://www.nytimes.com/ref/us/20070417\\_SHOOTING\\_GRAPHIC.html](http://www.nytimes.com/ref/us/20070417_SHOOTING_GRAPHIC.html) is 1st most fatal school shooting, and an example of multiple close lecture rooms. Aurora Movie Theater: [http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2012/07/20/us/The-Shooting-in-Aurora.html?\\_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2012/07/20/us/The-Shooting-in-Aurora.html?_r=0)) is example of auditorium shooting.
3. Building is not planned for a key upgrade and/or remodel.

The ASLDSC did receive suggestions to include some method for using District Police data (e.g. reports of threats, or acts of violence), or other District data (e.g. student or employee disciplinary actions), to adjust the prioritization. The ASLDSC did consider this, but found that the available data was not

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sufficient to use for prioritization purposes. Simply, there are relatively few of these types of events, and they do not appear to be related to one particular building or another.

Based on this rubric the ASLDSC recommended the immediate installation of new locks at the Call Child Development, as this would allow Facilities Operations an opportunity to address an obvious vulnerability, and to assess the associated costs and complexities of the conversion. The cost of just the materials for this project is approximately \$18,000 and the actual installation was done by the District Locksmith, Eric Rausch.

Based on the rubric the buildings that the ASLDSC recommends for lock upgrades are as follows:

1. Call Child Development Center (Rubric 1, 2 and 3) - Completed
2. Emeritus Hall (Rubric 2 and 3)
3. Race Health Sciences Building (Rubric 2 and 3)
4. Maggini Hall (Rubric 2 and 3)

The ASLDSC felt that it was prudent to only identify three buildings in addition to the Call Center, as there may be significant developments with regard to facilities in the near future. For example, the District will be developing a Facilities Master Plan, and is currently considering a new facilities bond. At this point in time, the buildings that the committee identified are not being considered for remodel and/or replacement, and thus would be good candidates for a lock upgrade.

### **Recommendation 3: ALERTU Enrollment**

The District should seek to greatly increase the number of faculty, staff and students who subscribe to the ALERTU text messaging system. This will allow critical emergency messaging to reach our faculty, staff and students in a timely fashion. The District needs to consider making the enrollment mandatory if possible.

### **Recommendation 4: Early Intervention**

One of the most important methods of preventing active shooter situations, is to practice early intervention, before problems escalate into violence. The District should continue to provide, and if possible increase, psychological services to the staff, faculty and student community.

The ASLDSC found that Student Health Services does an excellent job of providing students with access to a wide variety of health services including psychological services. In addition, the District has a Crisis Intervention Resource Team (CIRT) designed to assist faculty and staff in dealing with difficult, disruptive, or dangerous situations involving students. CIRT is comprised of representative from District Police, Student Services, Student Health Services, Student Psychological Services, Disability Resources Department, Counseling, and Sonoma County Behavioral Health.

With regard to intervention in dealing with difficult, disruptive, or dangerous situations involving employees, the District has an Employee Conduct Policy and Procedure (4.14a/4.14aP), a Workplace Violence Policy and Procedure (4.14c/4.14cP), and an Employee Crisis Assistance Team

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(ECAT) which is comprised of representatives from the Human Resources and District Police Departments, but can be augmented by CIRT members as necessary.

Draft 7-22-14